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I. INTRODUCTION
The desire to regulate the participation of lawyers in trial public-
ity is not new. As early as 1908 the American Bar Association (ABA)
recognized that newspaper publications by a lawyer concerning pend-
ing litigation could interfere with fair trials and the administration of
justice. The ABA endeavored to discourage such publications by
adopting Canon 20. Canon 20 provided:
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated liti-
gation may interfere with a fair trial in the courts and otherwise
prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they are to be
condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a
statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously.
An ex parte reference to the facts should not go beyond quotations
from the records and papers on file in the court; but even in extreme
* Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina. B.A. 1968, Clemson University; J.D. 1973,
University of South Carolina.
1
Swerling: The Right to Free Speech Versus the Right to a Fair Trial--Balanc
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement.1
This vague ethical suggestion was in place for years and, not surpris-
ingly, was largely ignored.2 Interest in the issue of lawyer communica-
tion with the media revived after extraordinary publicity dominated
two murder cases.
In 1963, President John F. Kennedy's assassination evoked intense
nationwide attention regarding the case against Lee Harvey Oswald.
The publicity continued up to and following Oswald's murder.3 The
report' of the Commission headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren criti-
cized the Dallas police department 5 and the news media' for their roles
in creating the publicity surrounding the case against Oswald. The
Commission noted that although the public had a profound interest in
the events surrounding the assassination, neither the press nor the
public had a right to be informed of the evidence being accumulated
against Oswald. The Commission stated: "The courtroom, not the
newspaper or television screen, is the appropriate forum in our system
for the trial of a man accused of a crime. ' ' 7 The Warren Report recom-
mended that the bar, the police, and the media work together to estab-
lish ethical standards for publicity, "so that there will be no interfer-
ence with pending criminal investigations, court proceedings or the
right of individuals to a fair trial." In response, the ABA Advisory
Commission on Fair Trial and Free Press (Reardon Committee) was
formed in 1964 to consider attorney participation in trial publicity.9
While the Reardon Committee studied the problem of establishing
ethical guidelines, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in another
1. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 20 (1908).
2. Reardon, The Fair Trial-Free Press Standards, 54 A.BA J. 343, 344 (1968).
3. Note, Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer: Gag Rules-The First Amendment
vs. the Sixth, 30 Sw. L.J. 507, 510 (1976).
4. THE WARREN COMM'N, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSI-
NATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY (1964).
5. Id, at 20, 231-40.
6. Id. at 240-42.
7. Id. at 240.
8. Id, at 27.
9. The ABA Advisory Commission on Fair Trial and Free Press was chaired by
the Honorable Paul C. Reardon. Judge Reardon recounted the formation of the
Committee:
For some time the American Bar Association had been concerned with launch-
ing studies in the criminal field. It was not contemplated at first that a sepa-
rate study would be made of the possible effects of news reporting on criminal
trials. However, the recommendations of the Warren Commission [were gener-
ally] that the Bar and the press should concern themselves with . . . [the]
strengthening of professional discipline ....
Reardon, supra note 2, at 343.
[Vol. 42
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sensational murder case, Sheppard v. Maxwell.10 Sheppard was ac-
cused of bludgeoning his wife to death. On the day of his wife's funeral,
the first in an avalanche of news stories criticizing Sheppard appeared.
The stories initially stressed Sheppard's alleged failure to cooperate
with the authorities and his failure to submit to a lie detector test. The
sources for these stories included police officers, the coroner, and the
county attorney. Newspapers printed editorials calling for official ac-
tion against Sheppard. In response, an inquest held in a school gymna-
sium before several hundred spectators was broadcast live. Newspaper
accounts accentuated evidence which tended to incriminate Sheppard.
Police officials disclosed scientific evidence and called for Sheppard's
arrest. The negative publicity intensified during the period between
Sheppard's arrest and indictment. In fact, the Court observed that it
had in its possession five volumes filled with clippings compiled from
three local papers during a six-month period."
At Sheppard's trial, approximately twenty reporters sat at a table
set up inside the bar behind counsel. The media used all the rooms on
the courtroom floor for their activities. The local television station
broadcast from next door to the jury room. Reporters filled the court-
room to capacity during the entire nine-week trial. Reporters moving
in and out of the courtroom caused such a commotion that witnesses
could not be heard. The close proximity of the reporters forced Shep-
pard and his attorney to leave the courtroom to confer privately. Ju-
rors were not insulated from the circulation of news, rumor, and
gossip.",
The Court reversed Sheppard's conviction on the grounds that the
publicity which saturated the community13 and the carnival-like atmo-
sphere of the courtroom' 4 usurped Sheppard's due process, rights. 5
The Court held that the trial judge failed to control the flow of infor-
mation from the police, witnesses, and counsel for both sides, thus de-
priving Sheppard of his right to "receive a trial by an impartial jury
free from outside influences."' 6
The Court placed responsibility for ensuring Sheppard a fair trial
squarely on the shoulders of the trial judge. The Court suggested that
the trial judge should
have more closely regulated the number and conduct of newspersons
10. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
11. Id. at 337-58.
12. Id. at 355-59.
13. Id. at 363.
14. Id. at 358.
15. Id. at 363.
16. Id. at 359.
1991]
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in the courtroom; insulated prospective witnesses, who had been inter-
viewed at will by the media; controlled the release of information to
the press by the police, witnesses, and counsel, particularly statements
divulging prejudicial matters or belief in Sheppard's guilt or
innocence.
17
The Court admonished, "Collaboration between counsel and the press
as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only
subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of discipli-
nary measures.
18
Influenced by these two important events, the guidelines drawn by
the Reardon Committee curtailed attorney speech in an attempt to
control prejudicial trial publicity. The Reardon Committee's recom-
mendations were adopted substantially by the ABA as DR 7-107.19
II. TRIAL PUBLICITY UNDER THE MODEL CODE
DR 7-107 addresses the propriety of lawyer speech to the media
regarding both criminal and civil trials. The first part of the rule is
divided into sections that track the stages of a criminal prosecution:
investigation, the period from arrest to commencement of trial, jury
selection and trial, and sentencing. DR 7-107 lists types of statements
either prohibited or permitted at each stage.
During the initial two stages, a lawyer may not make statements a
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public
communication.2 0 Prohibited comments include those relating to the
character, reputation, or prior record of the defendant; the possibility
of a guilty plea; the contents of confessions; results of examinations;
identity and credibility of prospective witnesses; and opinions as to the
"guilt or innocence of the accused- the evidence or the merits of the
case."
21
During the trial and sentencing stages, an attorney is prohibited
from making statements a reasonable person would expect to be dis-
seminated by means of public communication, and when there is a rea-
sonable likelihood that the statement will interfere with a fair trial or
affect the imposition of sentence.22 DR 7-107(D) limits attorneys from
making remarks during this time which relate to "the trial, parties, or
issues in the trial or other matters that are reasonably likely to inter-
17. Id. at 358-61.
18. Id. at 363.
19. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RssPONsiBiLrry DR 7-107 (1969).
20. Id. DR 7-107(A), (B) (1980).
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fere with a fair trial. ,,2s Attorneys may quote from public records
without comment.
2 4
In 1983, the ABA House of Delegates adopted the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct to supersede the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. South Carolina adopted the new standards and they went
into effect September 1, 1990. Thus, Model Rule 3.6 now governs the
relationship between lawyers and the media in South Carolina.
25
III. TRIAL PUBLICITY UNDER THE MODEL RULEs
Rule 3.6 prohibits a lawyer from making an extrajudicial state-
ment that he knows or reasonably should know will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding if he
reasonably should expect that statement to be publicized.2 This lan-
guage differs dramatically from language found in DR 7-107(A) and
(B) which placed a fiat prohibition on attorneys' ex parte comments
regarding pending cases without addressing the probability or severity
of prejudice arising from the statements.2 7 In addition, Rule 3.6(b) fur-
nishes an inventory of statements which ordinarily will have a substan-
tial likelihood of material prejudice when made in reference to a civil
jury trial,28 a criminal case, or any other proceeding that could result in
incarceration. Presumptively prejudicial comments include those re-
garding (1) the character, credibility or criminal record of a party, sus-
pect, or witness, or the identity or expected testimony of a witness or
party; (2) the possibility of a guilty plea or the existence or contents of
any statement given by a suspect or defendant, or his refusal to make
such a statement; (3) performance or results of examinations or tests or
the refusal to submit to such tests, or the nature of physical evidence;
(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect;
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. S.C. App. CT. R. 407, Rule 3.6.
26. Much of the substance of Rule 3.6 was adopted when South Carolina's DR 7-
107 was rewritten in 1984.
27. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
28. Rule 3.6 specifically applies to civil matters triable by a jury, but this applica-
tion of the rule probably is not constitutionally valid. Both the Fourth and the Seventh
Circuit Courts of Appeal have found no-comment rules unconstitutionally overbroad
when applied to civil matters. Those courts focused on the differences between civil and
criminal trials, including: (1) the greater constitutional protection guaranteed a criminal
defendant under the Sixth Amendment; (2) the protracted nature of civil litigation
which could lead to restraint of comment lasting several years; and (3) the inherent en-
tanglement of many important social issues with civil litigation. See Hirschkop v. Snead,
594 F.2d 356, 373 (4th Cir. 1979); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 257
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
1991]
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(5) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely
to be inadmissible at trial and which would, if disclosed, create a sub-
stantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; and (6) the fact that a
defendant has been charged with a crime unless accompanied by a
statement that the defendant is presumed innocent unless proven
guilty.
29
Notwithstanding Rule 3.6(a) and (b)(1-5), an attorney permissibly
may, without elaboration, comment on (1) the general character of a
claim or defense, (2) information included in the public record, (3) the
general nature and scope of an investigation, (4) scheduling or result of
stages in litigation, (5) request for assistance in obtaining information,
(6) a warning of danger concerning a person who poses a likely threat
of substantial harm, and (7) in a criminal case, biographical informa-
tion on the accused; information necessary to aid in his capture; fact,
time and place of arrest; and the identity of the investigating officers.30
Rules 3.6(b) and (c) parallel types of statements treated in DR 7-
107(b) and (c). Rule 3.6 adds prohibitions regarding inadmissible, prej-
udicial information and disclosure of charges made without an appro-
priate warning regarding innocence. The provisions of DR 7-107(c)(7)
allowing a description of physical evidence seized and DR 7-107(c)(11)
allowing a statement that the defendant denied the charges have both
been omitted from Rule 3.6.31
IV. FAIR TRIAL VERSUS FREE SPEECH
No significant dispute exists about what types of remarks are sub-
ject to the trial publicity rules. Debate centers around the issue of
whether no-comment rules impermissibly circumscribe First Amend-
ment rights of free speech.
Certainly attorneys, like all citizens, enjoy First Amendment pro-
tection, even when they participate in the administration of justice.3 2
However, this safeguard must be considered within the context of the
defendant's right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
The right to a fair trial is "the most fundamental of all freedoms. 33
29. See S.C. App. CT. R. 407, Rule 3.6(b)(1).
30. See id., Rule 3.6(c)(1)-(7).
31. Rule 7-107(c)(7) was omitted because revelations of physical evidence seized
may be substantially prejudicial and are frequently the subject of pretrial suppression
motions, which, if successful, may be circumvented by prior disclosure to the press.
MODEL RULES O' PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.6 model code comparison (1983).
32. In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 614, 449 A.2d 483, 489 (1982).
33. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965). The Court set aside the conviction in
Estes because the procedure employed by the State of Texas involved such a probability
of prejudice that the procedure was inherently lacking in due process. This was true even
[Vol. 42
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Thus, the question becomes whether the court may infringe on one
constitutional right in order to uphold another.
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart" the United States Su-
preme Court refused to issue a blanket ruling that the Sixth Amend-
ment supersedes the First Amendment, at least in regard to protected
speech accorded the media.35 In Nebraska Press a trial court issued a
restraining order prohibiting the media from publishing accounts of
confessions allegedly made by an accused murder. The defendant had
been charged with brutally slaying a family residing in a rural
community.36
The Court found that tensions develop between the First and
Sixth Amendment when a criminal trial is a sensational one.ar Under
normal circumstances, criminal trials can be fair in spite of widespread
publicity.38 The Court determined the question is whether the means
employed to protect the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were for-
bidden by the First Amendment.39 Nebraska Press involved a prior re-
straint on the press. According to the Court, prior restraints "are the
most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights." ° This is because the media publish information about court
proceedings and open the proceedings to public scrutiny, both valuable
societal benefits. However, according to the Court, the "extraordinary
protections afforded by the First Amendment carry with them some-
thing in the nature of a fiduciary duty to exercise the protected rights
responsibly . "..."41
As in Sheppard, the Court observed that another method of en-
suring a fair trial without ordering a prior restraint would be for the
trial court to limit comments by police, witnesses, and participating
lawyers.42 In his concurrence, Justice Brennan applauded the Nebraska
though "[t]he press coverage of the Estes trial was not nearly as massive and pervasive
as the attention given [by the media] to the Sheppard prosecution." Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U.S. 333, 353 (1966).
34. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
35. Id. at 542.
36. Id. at 551.
37. Id. at 554.
38. Id. at 556.
39. But c.f. Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137, 1146-47 (E.D. Va.
1976), afl'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir.
1979); (the right to a fair trial is superior to the right of free speech); In re Hinds, 90
N.J. 604, 616, 449 A.2d 483, 490 (1982) (the criminal "defendant's constitutional right to
a fair trial must take precedence over free speech .... ") (citing Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976)).
40. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
41. Id. at 560.
42. Id. at 564. One article has noted that "[d]espite its concern for the first amend-
1991]
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Bar-Press Guidelines' attempt to regulate disclosure of information
about a pending criminal trial in a manner intended to preserve an
accused's Sixth Amendment rights.
43
The Nebraska Press Court noted that to determine whether no-
comment rules pass constitutional muster, a court must examine each
restriction to determine whether "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted
by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is neces-
sary to avoid the danger." This less protective standard may be ap-
propriate in cases when the restriction on speech does not amount to a
prior restraint. The mention of this less stringent test in Nebraska
Press, however, has been labeled anomalous because Nebraska Press
involved a prior restraint.45
Thus, as recently reiterated by the United States Supreme
Court,40 the fundamental constitutionality of attorney no-comment
rules appeared to be well established. The language in Sheppard man-
dating that courts possess both the power and the responsibility to en-
sure a fair trial is cited extensively in cases discussing attorney no-
comment rules.47 This is partially because lawyers are officers of the
court and have a duty to protect the judicial process." Therefore, the
questions left open for argument have revolved around an examination
of the scope and application of attorney no-comment rules. 49
V. EVALUATING NO-COMMENT RULES
A preliminary issue addressed by the courts is whether to evaluate
no-comment rules as prior restraints. As noted earlier,50 prior re-
straints on speech and publication are highly intolerable encroach-
ment right3 of the press ... the court showed no such solicitude for the free speech
rights of defendants and their attorneys." Freedman & Starwood, Prior Restraints on
Freedom of Expression by Defendants and Defense Attorneys: Ratio Decidendi v.
Obiter Dictum, 29 STAN. L. REv. 607, 607 (1977) [hereinafter Prior Restraints].
43. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 613 (Brennan, J., concurring). The guidelines, in-
cluded as an appendix to Justice Brennan's opinion, are similar in many respects to the
Model Rules.
44. Id. at 562 (citing United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd,
341 U.S. 494 (1951)). See also L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 58-61 (1958); Matheson,
The Prosecutor, The Press, and Free Speech, 58 FoPAn L. Rnv. 865, 927 n.382 (1990).
45. Matheson, supra note 44, at 927 n.382.
46. See infra notes 108-26 and accompanying text.
47. Note, Restrictions on Attorneys' Extrajudicial Comments on Pending Litiga-
tion-The Constitutionality of Disciplinary Rule 7-107: Hirschkop v. Snead, 41 Osno
ST. LJ. 771, 789 n.113 (1980).
48. Id. at 886.
49. Id. at 789.
50. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 42
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ments on rights protected by the First Amendment."' Restrictions al-
leged to be prior restraints come before the court "with a 'heavy
presumption' against [their] validity.
'5 2
In Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer53 the court held that no-
comment rules could not be labeled as prior restraints." The court
conceded that a court could punish a lawyer who violated disciplinary
rules with its contempt power and that the threat of contempt is an
important attribute of a prior restraint. However, the court distin-
guished a prior restraint, which is a predetermined judicial prohibition
and cannot be violated even though the judicial action is unconstitu-
tional, from a court regulation, which can be challenged when one is
prosecuted for its violation.5  Moreover, as stated earlier, the Su-
preme Court apparently approves no-comment rules as measures that
fall short of prior restraints on publication and that tend to blunt the
impact of negative trial publicity.
5 7
Because no-comment rules possess some of the inherent features
of prior restraints, the judiciary reviews the rules with particular care. 58
Whenever First Amendment rights come into conflict with a compel-
ling governmental interest, a court must balance the individual and so-
cietal interest in free expression against the public interest that the
regulation restraining expression seeks to protect. The court also must
find that a substantial relationship exists between the interest and the
regulation.5 9 Further, the regulation must be narrowly tailored to effect
51. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
52. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975) (quoting
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 482 U.S. 415 (1970)), cert. denied, 427 U.S.
912 (1976).
53. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). See infra notes
79-86 and accompanying text for additional discussion of this case.
54. Chicago Council, 522 F.2d at 248-49.
55. Id. at 248. Several other courts also have treated no-comment rules as non-
prior restraints. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 1979); Central S.C.
Chapter, Soc'y of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182,
1188( ), affd in part, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
But see Levine v. United States Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986) (order precluding attorneys from making
statements to media regarding espionage case "properly characterized as a prior
restraint").
56. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
57. See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 564.
58. Chicago Council, 522 F.2d at 249.
59. Comment, Professional Ethics and Trial Publicity: What All the Talk is
About, 10 SUFFOLK UL. RE V. 654, 660-61 (1976). See also In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 614,
449 A.2d 483, 488 (1982) ("A restriction on free speech can survive judicial scrutiny
under the First Amendment only if certain fundamental and stringent conditions are
satisfied. First, the limitation must 'further an important or substantial governmental
1991]
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The first two stages of the analysis rarely are disputed. Plainly,
the state seeks to preserve the accused's constitutional right to a fair
trial and the due administration of justice. These are compelling inter-
ests which can be affected by adverse publicity.61 Moreover, a substan-
tial relationship exists between regulating extrajudicial statements
made by attorneys involved in prosecuting litigation and the interests
sought to be protected. Therefore, the no-comment rules pass constitu-
tional muster as to the first two prongs of the test.
The controversy arises in investigating the final requirement that
any restriction on free speech be no greater than necessary to further
the governmental interest being protected. 62 The dispute centers
around the disagreement over what standard should be applied to
avoid overbreadth in the no-comment rules.6 3 The Supreme Court has
not determined the proper standard for limiting speech made by attor-
neys involved in pending litigation.6 4 In Sheppard the Supreme Court
held that "where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news
prior to trial will prevent a fair trial . . . [t]he courts must take such
steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prej-
udicial outside interferences."6 DR 7-107 tracked this language when
it prohibited statements that were "reasonably likely" to cause
prejudice.66 The "reasonably likely" measurement explicitly modifies
only DR 7-107(D) and (E) (statements "reasonably likely to affect the
imposition of a sentence") regarding criminal trials. However, several
courts have assumed that the "reasonably likely" standard modifies
DR 7-107 in its entirety.
67
interest unrelated to the suppression of expression.' "Id. quoting Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) and In re Rachmiel, 90 N.J. 646, 449 A.2d 505 (1982)).
60. See Hinds, 90 N.J. at 614, 449 A.2d at 488 (and cases cited therein).
61. But see infra notes 136-44 and accompanying text for discussion of the view
that the state has no similar compelling interest when publicity is favorable to the ac-
cused, as would occur when a defense attorney makes statements to the media on behalf
of his client.
62. Chicago Council, 522 F.2d at 249 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
413 (1974)); Hinds, 90 N.J. at 614, 449 A.2d at 488.
63. "Since the right of free speech must give way to the right of a fair trial when
there is an irreconcilable conflict, the next inquiry relates to the limits of the circum-
scription on comment that lawyers can be required to observe consistent with their
rights under the First Amendment." Chicago Council, 522 F.2d at 248.
64. Comment, Professional Ethics and Trial Publicity: What All the Talk is
About, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 654, 668 (1976).
65. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
66. MODEL CODE OF PROPESSONAL REsPONSmmrry DR 7-107 (1980).
67. See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 1979).
It is obvious from a reading of the entire rule that the drafters were concerned
with speech for publication which had a reasonable likelihood of interference
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
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A. The "Reasonably Likely" Standard
Several courts have upheld the "reasonably likely" standard as be-
ing sufficiently narrow to satisfy constitutional demands. In Hirschkop
v. Snead68 an attorney challenged the constitutionality of Virginia's
version of DR 7-107. At the time of the challenge, the attorney,
Hirschkop, had no complaints pending against him, but he had been
cited eleven times in the preceding thirteen years. On one occasion, a
complaint was filed against Hirschkop for stating to the press that his
client was "a good guy."
'69
The court reiterated that First Amendment rights are not abso-
lute, but may be considered in the context of the environment in which
the speech is made.70 The court proceeded to address statements made
during criminal proceedings. The court found that less intrusive means
than DR 7-107 are inadequate to ensure an accused the right to a fair
trial. The court discerned that the inequity developed because most
prejudicial publicity occurs during the investigatory stage of a proceed-
ing before the matter comes before a judge. Thus, it is not feasible for
a judge to restrict speech on an ad hoc basis. 1'
The court noted that the press "may publish any information in
its possession . . . , but lawyers are directed to try their cases in the
court and not in the press. '7 2 This is because lawyers have a fiduciary
responsibility to their clients, as well as a duty to the court, litigants,
and the public to ensure the integrity of the judicial process. The court
reasoned that lawyers' duties arise because they possess special privi-
leges not enjoyed by other citizens.7
3
The Hirschkop court observed that many remarks made by attor-
neys regarding pending litigation are so inherently prejudicial that at-
torneys should be censured for making them.7" However, the court re-
jected the notion that DR 7-107 implicates a prior restraint on speech.
DR 7-107 applies in every situation where exceptions to free speech
exist, and violations may not be punished without due process. 5
with a fair trial. It does not strain the language of the rule to treat that qualifi-
cation as implicit in each of the expressed prohibitions.
Id.; but cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 3.6 (1983) (using "substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing" a fair trial).
68. 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979).
69. Id. at 362.
70. Id. at 363.
71. Id. at 365.
72. Id. at 366.
73. Id. The court also noted that attorneys are subject to discipline for failing to
discharge their particular obligations. Id.
74. Id. at 367.
75. Id. at 368. Prior restraint violations are summarily punishable as contempt. Id.
1991]
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Therefore, the court concluded that "[n]o heavier or stiffer standard
than the reasonable likelihood test is needed to protect [lawyers] from
disciplinary sanctions for speech for publication without adequate no-
tice of the consequences.
'76
The court characterized DR 7-107 as explicit in informing lawyers
of what they may and may not say for publication. The court found
that the "reasonable likelihood test divides the innocuous from the cul-
pable, adds clarity to the rule and makes it more definite in applica-
tion. ''77 Most importantly, the court expressed its view that lawyers
may be held to higher standards than other participants in the judicial
process.7
8
B. The Serious and Imminent Threat Test
Other courts have rejected the reasonable likelihood standard. In
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer 9 the Chicago Council of Lawyers
and seven attorneys sought declaratory relief on behalf of themselves
and other attorneys who practiced in the Northern District of Illinois.
The plaintiffs contended that the no-comment rules of the district
court deprive lawyers of their free speech rights under the First
Amendment.8 0 The attorneys asserted that the "reasonable likelihood
of interference with a fair trial" standard was overbroad and vague and
therefore unable to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The plaintiffs
also argued there was no need to balance their free speech rights
against a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial because the
two provisions do not conflict.81
The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the First and Sixth
Amendments did not collide except in the abstract. The court reiter-
ated that the right to a fair trial is the most fundamental of all free-
doms.8 2 Therefore, courts not only have a duty to ensure judicial integ-
rity, but the inherent power to formulate rules that protect the judicial
process from outside influences.
8 3
The court found that the next inquiry was to discern the extent to
which lawyers could be limited in their speech consistent with attor-
neys' First Amendment rights. The court noted that any restriction on
76. Id. at 369.
77. Id. at 370.
78. Id.
79. 522 F.2d 242 (1975). In Chicago Council the plaintiffs sought declaratory judg-
ment and injunction against enforcement of a local criminal rule and DR 7-107.
80. Id. at 247.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 248 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)).
83. Id. (citing Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363).
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a constitutional right must possess "clearness, precision, and
narrowness."
8 4
Applying the constitutional test to DR 7-107 and the local court
rules, the court held that the no-comment rules were overbroad. The
court adopted a "narrower and more restrictive" standard of proscrib-
ing statements that "pose a 'serious and imminent threat' of interfer-
ence with the fair administration of justice .... ,,85
The Chicago Council court commented that the public placed spe-
cial credibility on comments made by attorneys, and thus lawyers' re-
marks become an important source of prejudicial publicity. In view of
the special deference given attorneys' statements to the media, the
court reasoned that "prohibiting only the speech of a very small group
whose members are officers of the court with a special interest in pro-
tecting the integrity of our system of justice"86 is a relatively unobtru-
sive means of controlling trial publicity.
C. The Clear and Present Danger Test
The clear and present danger test historically has been applied to
prior restraints and to use the court's contempt power to punish extra-
judicial remarks concerning pending litigation or grand jury investiga-
tions.87 The clear and present danger test was used to restrict attorney
speech in Markfield v. Association of the Bar.s8 In Markfield the attor-
ney participated in a radio panel discussion about prison rebellions
while he was participating as an attorney in a prison riots trial. He was
charged with violating DR 7-107(D). The Markfield court acknowl-
edged that the purpose of DR 7-107(D) was to "achieve a fair balance
between the attorney's right of free speech as opposed to society's in-
terest in protecting the integrity of the judicial process and thereby
guaranteeing a fair and impartial trial."89 The court determined that
only when extrajudicial attorney speech presents a clear and present
danger to the administration of justice is there a likelihood of interfer-
84. Id. at 249.
85. Id.; see also In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971); In re Lasswell, 296 Or.
121, 673 P.2d 855 (1983) (applying "serious and imminent threat" standard).
86. 522 F.2d at 250.
87. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
375 (1962); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931) (prior restraint); see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (first artic-
ulation of clear and present danger test to limit free speech rights).
88. 49 A.D.2d 516, 370 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1975); see also In re Keller, 213 Mont. 196,
693 P.2d 1211 (1984) (discussing all three tests in relation to DR 7-107(B) and (H) but
declining to adopt any one test; also holding DR 7-107(B) and (H) unconstitutional).
89. Markfield, 49 A.D.2d at 517, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
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ence with an impartial trial.00
The court in In re Hinds9' considered but rejected the clear and
present danger test. In Hinds the attorney under investigation, Hinds,
was an active civil rights lawyer and director of the National Confer-
ence of Black Lawyers. Hinds represented a reputedly militant black
woman during pretrial proceedings who had been accused of killing a
New Jersey state trooper. These early controversies involved the ac-
cused's incarceration. Hinds did not represent the defendant at her
criminal trial.
9 2
Hinds called a press conference to criticize the judge during the
time a jury was being impaneled for the criminal proceeding.9 3 Hinds
declared that he spoke for the defense team, whose members evidently
were subject to a gag order. After television and newspaper coverage
divulged Hinds's remarks, the county ethics committee began an inves-
tigation to determine whether Hinds's comments violated DR 7-107(D)
and DR 1-102(A)(5).'
Hinds asserted that DR 7-107(D) was unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad under the First Amendment. Hinds argued that limiting
speech is permissible only when out-of-court statements present a clear
and present danger to trial, and that his remarks did not warrant sanc-
tion under this standard.9 5
The court rejected Hinds's allegations. It applied the two-step test
articulated in Procunier v. Martinez:0 first, the restriction must fur-
ther important governmental interests unrelated to suppression of
speech, and second, the circumscription must be as narrowly tailored
as possible.9 7 The court then balanced the gravity and probability of
harm caused by allowing the expression against the extent free speech
would be inhibited by suppression. 8
The court found that the state has a substantial interest in secur-
ing a fair trial not only for the benefit of an accused, but also for the
benefit of the public at large. The court observed that the state also
90. Id.
91. 90 N.J. 604, 449 A.2d 483 (1982). See also In re Rachmiel, 90 N.J. 646, 449 A.2d
605 (1982) (companion case to In re Hinds); In re Zimmerman, 764 S.W.2d 757 (Tenn.),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1107 (1989).
92. In re Hinds, 90 N.J. at 610, 449 A.2d at 486.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 611, 449 A.2d at 486-87. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
Try DR 1-102(A), DR 7-107 (1980).
95. Hinds, 90 N.J. at 613, 449 A.2d at 488.
96. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
97. Id. at 413.
98. Hinds, 90 N.J. at 614, 449 A.2d at 488 (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539 (1976)).
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has a substantial interest in assuring a competent, ethical bar.9 9 More-
over, the court noted that attorneys are officers of the court and as
such "occupy a special status and perform an essential function in the
administration of justice."100 Thus, a lawyer cannot utilize "a public
forum to obstruct justice and interfere with a fair trial [and then] in-
voke the protection of the first amendment" to avoid discipline.10'
Determining whether DR 7-107(D) is narrowly tailored to effect
the state's interests is a difficult issue. The court conceded that usually
First Amendment rights can be restricted only if the speech "creates 'a
clear and present danger' of threatening some substantial governmen-
tal interest unrelated to the suppression of expression." 02 However,
the court in In re Hinds found that attorney judicial speech in criminal
proceedings was different. 10 3 The court rejected the clear and present
danger test as being no more precise than the reasonable likelihood
standard.10 4 The court acknowledged that a clear and present danger
measure may be more strict, but found that the reasonable likelihood
test nevertheless met the constitutional requisite of narrow tailoring.
Significantly, the court found that extrajudicial speech potentially in-
sinuates extraneous matters into criminal cases. The court observed
that "if left unchecked, [outside influences] could divert the search for
truth and wreck the intricate machinery of the criminal justice
system." 5
In response to concerns evidenced by the courts and attorneys, the
ABA's Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal
Justice assigned the job of re-evaluating the attorney no-comment
rules to a task force on fair trial and free press. The task force recom-
mended replacing the reasonable likelihood standard with one requir-
ing clear and present danger of harm to a protected interest. The task
force recommended adopting of a four-step analysis approved in
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia."6 The analysis subse-
quently was adopted by the ABA and provides the following test: (1)
Does the restriction advance a legitimate governmental interest? (2)
Does the public comment pose an extremely serious threat to the gov-
ernmental interest sought to be protected? (3) Does that threat appear
likely to occur imminently? (4) Is the restriction on public comment
99. Id. at 616, 449 A.2d at 489.
100. Id. at 615, 449 A.2d at 489.
101. Id. at 616, 449 A.2d at 490 (citing In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 649 (1959) (Stew-
art, J., concurring)).
102. Id. at 618-19, 449 A.2d at 490-91 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 619, 449 A.2d at 491.
104. Id. at 622, 449 A.2d at 493.
105. Id. at 622, 449 A.2d at 494.
106. 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978).
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necessary to secure the protection or advancement of the jeopardized
governmental interest in jeopardy?
10 7
D. The Substantial Likelihood Test
In states that have adopted the Model Rules, attorney speech is
protected unless it presents a "substantial likelihood of materially prej-
udicing an adjudicative proceeding."'' 08
The United States Supreme Court recently concluded that the
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard satisfies the
First Amendment in Gentile v. State Bar.109 In Gentile the Discipli-
nary Board of the Nevada Bar recommended a private reprimand of
Gentile based on comments he made at a press conference in reference
to a pending criminal matter.
Gentile's client was accused of taking money and drugs from a
safety deposit box rented by undercover police officers. Gentile called a
press conference the day after his client was indicted in order to re-
spond to adverse publicity. During the press conference, Gentile de-
clared that he had evidence to prove his client's innocence, and he
characterized his client as a scapegoat of the police. He called potential
witnesses convicted drug dealers and money launderers, and he named
a certain police officer as a likely perpetrator who abused drugs. 10
Gentile made these remarks after reviewing Nevada Supreine Court
Rule 177.111
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the private reprimand. The
court found that a "reasonable attorney, especially after having
researched the issue, should have known that his conduct was im-
107. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8-1.1 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986) (Fair
Trial and Free Press) Commentary. See also Note, Restrictions on Attorneys' Extraju-
dicial Comments on Pending Litigation-The Constitutionality of Disciplinary Rule 7-
107; Hirschkop v. Snead, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 771, 778 (1980) (citing ABA STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUsTICE, FAIR TRIAL AmD FREE PREss 1 (2d Tent.
Draft 1978)).
108. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.6(a) (1983).
109. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991). The Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 7,
1991, on the following questions: (1) whether First Amendment speech and press clauses
limit the power of the state to punish a lawyer for speech when there is no evidence that
his statements could or did interfere with the impartial administration of justice; (2)
whether speech regarding the behavior of public officials in an area of public concern
may be forbidden, and if so, under what circumstances; and (3) whether a state supreme
court rule using a substantial likelihood of material prejudice standard is impermissibly
vague and overbroad under the First Amendment and Due Process Clause. See 59
U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. July 17, 1990) (No. 89-1836).
110. Id. at 2739.
111. Id. NEVADA SUPREME COURT RULE 177 is based on the MODEL RULES OF PROFS-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1983). Id. at 2745.
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proper, particularly with respect to the comments regarding the police
detective and other potential witnesses. 11 2 The court held that Gen-
tile's comments probably would prejudice the proceedings based on the
timing of the statements and because the case was highly publicized.
The court also found that the remarks were substantially likely to ma-
terially prejudice the proceedings. Although the court acknowledged
that there was no actual prejudice in this case,11 3 it recognized actual
prejudice is not required to establish a substantial likelihood of
prejudice.2
4
On appeal, Gentile asserted that attorney speech should be limited
only when there is a clear and present danger of actual prejudice or
imminent threat to a judicial proceeding. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter rejected this argument.
The Court acknowledged that this country's criminal justice system is
grounded on the notion that impartial jurors should decide criminal
trials based on evidence presented in court, not in the newspapers. The
Court also observed that the criminal justice system is but a part of a
government of the people, however, and that the people at large re-
quire information, particularly through the media, in order to make
changes to the system. According to the Court, the media disseminates
necessary information to the public, and for this reason a clear and
present danger standard will be applied to media speech. The majority
found that lawyers representing clients in pending cases could be sub-
jected to a less demanding test than the media when engaging in trial
publicity." 5 The Court observed that attorneys are "key participants
in the criminal justice system, and the State may demand some adher-
ence to the precepts of that system in regulating their speech as well as
their conduct.""n 6 The Court also found that attorneys often have spe-
cial access to information so that the public may perceive attorneys'
statements in the media to be authoritative."
Once the Court determined that attorney extrajudicial speech may
be regulated by a less stringent standard than clear and present dan-
ger, it applied a balancing test to determine whether the "substantial
likelihood test" of Nevada's Rule 177 was constitutional. The Court
112. Gentile v. State Bar, 106 Nev. 60, 61, 787 P.2d 386, 387 (1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct.
2720 (1991).
113. Id. It is unclear whether this is because Gentile's client was acquitted at trial
six months after his indictment, or because some other evidence existed that showed no
prejudice.
114. Id.
115. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2744.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2745 (citing In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 627, 449 A.2d 483, 496 (1982) and
In re Rachmiel, 90 N.J. 646, 656, 449 A.2d 505, 511 (1982)).
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found that for the above reasons the state had a legitimate interest in
regulating attorney speech, and that Rule 177 was narrowly tailored to
limit attorney "comments that are likely to influence the actual out-
come of the trial, and . . . comments that are likely to prejudice the
jury venire, even if an untainted panel can ultimately be found."'1 8
The Court conceded that trial prejudice may be cured through change
of venue, voir dire, or other device, but that the state has a substantial
interest in avoiding the costs, presumably in time, money, and re-
sources, inherent in implementing these curatives. 1" 9
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Marshall, Stevens, Blackmun,
and O'Connor in a separate concurrence, reversed Gentile's conviction
on the basis that Rule 177's "safe harbor" provision was void for
vagueness. 120 The Court found that the language of the safe harbor
provision
contemplates that a lawyer describing the 'general nature of the...
defense' 'without elaboration' need fear no discipline, even if he com-
ments on '[t]he character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of
a... witness,' and even if he 'knows or reasonably should know that
[the statement] will have a substantial likelihood of materially preju-
dicing an adjudicative proceeding.'. . . In the context before us, these
terms have no settled usage or tradition of interpretation in law. The
lawyer has no principle for determining when his remarks pass from
the safe harbor of the general to the forbidden sea of the
elaborated.
121
The Court was persuaded by the fact that Gentile made a con-
scious effort to comply with Rule 177, and yet still was disciplined for
his statements to the press. The Court determined that Gentile had
been misled by the vague language of the safe harbor provision, and
thus had not received fair notice that his conduct would be subject to
discipline. More importantly, the Court cautioned that a vague regula-
tion could encourage discriminatory enforcement by the state, particu-
larly when attorneys' statements are critical of the state.
22
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Souter
dissented from the Court's reversal. The dissent asserted that Gentile
was well aware that his statements to the media were prohibited under
Rule 177. The dissent noted that Gentile called the press conference
118. Id.; Justice Kennedy wrote that the Court was limited to reviewing Nevada's
interpretation of Rule 177. Id. at 2724. The majority disagreed, noting that many states
apply the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" test. Id. at 2742 n.4.
119. Id. at 2745.
120. Id. at 2731.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2732.
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specifically to prejudice his client's trial by influencing potential jurors,
and that he would not have gone to the trouble had there not been a
substantial likelihood of success.1 23 Although the majority found it im-
portant that Gentile's comments were made six months in advance of
trial so that their impact on the jury was minimal, the dissent argued
that the necessity of showing actual prejudice would allow attorneys
who made prejudicial comments to escape discipline if, for unrelated
reasons, the trial is not affected. By the same token, another attorney
making equally reprehensible statements might be disciplined when
the pending trial is prejudiced. According to the dissent, "[t]he United
States Constitution does not mandate such a fortuitous difference.'
124
Justices Kennedy, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun perceived
Gentile's statements as political criticism entitled to the highest First
Amendment protection.125 Consequently, they would have struck down
Nevada's interpretation of Rule 177 as insufficiently deferential to the
attorney's First Amendment rights, preferring instead a "clear and pre-
sent danger" standard.
2 6
With the retirement of Justice Marshall and probable appoint-
ment of a conservative replacement, the Court's majority position that
attorney speech may be restricted appears to be inextricably woven
into the law. However, the Court has upheld a more stringent "sub-
stantial likelihood of material prejudice" test. This standard arguably
will allow attorneys greater First Amendment freedom than the "rea-
sonably likely" criterion articulated in DR 7-107.
E. Third Party Challenges
Parties other than attorneys also have endeavored to challenge no-
comment rules. In Central South Carolina Chapter, Society of Profes-
sional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi v. Martin 27 the plaintiffs, media
members and one newspaper subscriber, challenged an order prohibit-
ing trial participants in a criminal case from making prejudicial state-
ments to, granting interviews with, or being in the proximity of the
press. The plaintiffs asserted that the order destroyed the press's right
to gather news from important sources."'
The Martin court held that the press has no constitutional right to
123. Id. at 2746.
124. Id. at 2748.
125. Id. at 2724.
126. Id. at 2725.
127. 431 F. Supp. 1182, afl'd in part, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1978).
128. Id. at 1184-85.
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gather information. 129 The court observed that the restraining order in-
cluded only participants in the criminal trial and thus the plaintiffs
had no standing to complain. At most, the plaintiffs suffered a genera-
lized grievance shared in equal measure by the public at large and un-
worthy of adjudication. 130 Moreover, the plaintiffs failed to show that
had the order not been issued, the trial participants would have dis-
closed information desired by plaintiffs. 13 1 Thus, their alleged injury
was merely speculative.
The court remarked that even if the plaintiffs had standing to
challenge the restraining order, the clear and present danger test which
underlies prior restraints to the press or public's right to speak or pub-
lish is inapplicable to the conduct of trial participants. The Martin
court indicated that a trial judge may take appropriate steps to protect
criminal defendants when a reasonable likelihood that publicity will
compromise trial proceedings exists.1
3 2
In National Broadcasting Co. v. Cooperman'33 NBC and an attor-
ney involved in a criminal action challenged a gag order which denied
counsel in the case from discussing any aspect of the proceedings with
the media. Unlike the court in Martin, the Cooperman court deter-
mined that the media petitioner had a constitutionally guaranteed
right to gather news and that the attorney petitioner was directly af-
fected by the order, so that both petitioners had standing. The court
differentiated between prior restraints on the media to publish and
prior restraints on attorneys to make extrajudicial statements. The
court found the latter category to be acceptable because attorneys have
an obligation to safeguard the right to a fair trial. The Cooperman
court adopted a standard of "a 'reasonable likelihood' of a serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice. ' 13 4 The court con-
cluded that prior restraints of attorney extrajudicial statements impli-
cated a less strict test than tests applied to prior restraints on publica-
tion. Here, the court found the directive'to be overbroad and not the
least restrictive alternative to preserve fair trial. 3 5
F. Application to Defense Counsel
Some commentators suggest that limitations on extrajudicial com-
ments should not be applied to defense counsel because the rules were
129. Id. at 1187 (citing Branzberg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)).
130. Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)).
131. Id. at 1187-88.
132. Id, at 1188 (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)).
133. 116 A.D.2d 287, 501 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1986).
134. Id. at 292, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
135. Id. at 294, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
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developed to protect Sixth Amendment rights of the accused.136 Argua-
bly, the state's interest in protecting an accused's Sixth Amendment
rights is not as compelling when his attorney's extrajudicial statements
are favorable to him. Courts have noted that defense attorney com-
ment is often a necessary ballast to balance scales typically weighted
heavily against criminal defendants. 13 Further, the Sixth Amendment
guarantees a fair trial to the criminal defendant, and not to the state.
Thus, publicity and extrajudicial statements that favor a criminal de-
fendant do not conflict with this constitutional right. The Supreme
Court's holding in Sheppard v. Maxwell,"53 that a trial judge has the
inherent power to control statements made by any and all participants
in order to protect the judicial process and guarantee a fair trial, how-
ever, seems to contradict this view. Although "[a] judicial process un-
tainted by prejudice against the prosecution is. . .a worthy goal,...
that is not the point so far as the Constitution is concerned." 39 If that
is true, there is no constitutional basis to justify application of no-com-
ment rules to defense counsel. Defendants possess a peculiar need for
free speech when they are accused of a crime. Under no-comment
rules:
Circumstances will virtually never occur in which the right to freedom
of speech could be of more importance to an individual than in the
course of criminal proceedings. The prosecutor is privileged to publish
to the world-including the defendant's family, friends, neighbors,
and business associates-what in almost any other context would con-
stitute libel per se. The indictment may contain detailed charges of
the most heinous conduct, and the delay before ultimate vindication
may be many months, if not years. In the meantime, entirely apart
from the proceedings in court, the good name earned during a lifetime
can be demolished. There can be no more pressing occasion, therefore,
for immediate, effective public rebuttal.
40
136. See, e.g., J. HALL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmi.rrY OF THE CRIMINAL LAWYER 522
(1987); Freedman & Starwood, Prior Restraints, supra note 42.
137. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 250 (1975). See also In re
Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 623 n.4, 449 A.2d 483, 493 n.4 (1982) ("defendant and his counsel
need access to the public to combat the stigma of an indictment") for a listing of com-
mentaries regarding this argument. The court in United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969), took a different view and observed:
[T]he public has an overriding interest that justice be done in a controversy
between the government and individuals and has the right to demand and ex-
pect "fair trials designed to end in just judgments.". . . This objective may be
thwarted unless an order against extrajudicial statements applies to all parties
to a controversy.
Id. at 666 (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949) (citations omitted)).
138. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
139. Freedman & Starwood, Prior Restraints, supra note 42, at 612.
140. Id. at 613.
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A footnote in Gentile v. State Bar'41 reveals that at least four
members of the United States Supreme Court have disapproved of this
theory. Joined by Justices White, Scalia, and Souter, Chief Justice
Rehnquist opined that "[t]he remedy for prosecutorial abuses that vio-
late the rule lies not in self-help in the form of similarly prejudicial
comments by defense counsel, but in disciplining the prosecutor.'
1 42
Conversely, Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Marshall and Blackmun agreed
that defense attorneys may seek to counter publicity prejudicial to
their clients.143 It appears that this question has yet to be resolved.
It is apparent from both its language and interpretation that DR
7-107(A) applied to prosecuting counsel only.14 4 No such exception for
defense counsel is included in Rule 3.6.
VI. APPLICATION OF No-COMMENT RULES IN SOUTH CAROLINA
Any attorney in South Carolina can study Rule 3.6 and know pre-
cisely which types of extrajudicial statements are subject to its prohibi-
tion. The rule characterizes these statements as those that will ordina-
rily have a substantial likelihood of material prejudice. An attorney
seeking to comply with Rule 3.6 must consider a statement and the
circumstances extraordinary in order to speak. This judgment call is
subject to disciplinary action. The law surrounding the scope and ap-
plication of Rule 3.6 is still developing, however, and the manner in
which a South Carolina attorney's decision to speak will be called into
question under Rule 3.6 remains to be seen. Plainly, the Gentile case
impacts South Carolina lawyers.
The only South Carolina case that addresses attorney speech is In
re Delgado,'4 1 decided under prior rule DR 7-107(G). Counsel repre-
sented an inmate in his post-conviction relief trial. He wished to ar-
range an interview between his client and the press, but permission
was refused by the prosecuting solicitor. Thereafter, counsel escorted a
reporter from The State newspaper to a prison to interview his client.
Although counsel asserted the reason for the reporter's visit was legal,
the court held that he knew, or should have known, the interview was
not proper.14 The court stated that it was the attorney's duty to pre-
sent his client's cause in court, not to change his client's public image.
141. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
142. Id. at 2748 n.6.
143. Id. at 2735-36.
144. See In re Axelrod, 150 Vt. 136, 137-38, 549 A.2d 653, 654-55 (1988) (DR 7-
107(A) applies only to those investigating a criminal matter; defense attorneys are
brought in after charges are made).
145. 279 S.C. 293, 306 S.E.2d 591 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1057 (1984).
146. Id. at 297-99, 306 S.E.2d at 594-95.
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Therefore, the court found that counsel had violated DR 7-107(G).147
This case appears to follow the reasoning of those members of the
United States Supreme Court who agree that attorney statements to
the media properly may be restricted if the speech seeks to try a pend-
ing case in the court of public opinion, rather than before a jury.
VII. CONCLUSION
The determination by the Court in Gentile that the "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" standard is sufficiently narrow to be
constitutionally valid could be decisive in an appeal of a disciplinary
action in states that use Rule 3.6. Obviously, each attorney's goal is to
make the correct ethical choice in order to avoid discipline. The Gen-
tile case demonstrates that attorneys should take affirmative steps to
ensure that statements to the press fall within the strictures of the ap-
plicable disciplinary rule. At the very least, speech appearing to fall
outside applicable standards will be reprimanded on a case-by-case ba-
sis. Although the "substantial likelihood" test seems to allow lawyers
greater freedom to exercise their First Amendment rights, those prac-
ticing in the criminal area will be well advised not to stray from the
express parameters of Rule 3.6.
147. Id. at 300, 306 S.E.2d at 595-96.
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